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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit, at the European University 
Institute, was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as a 
forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
analyses in their own right, these projects should prove valuable 
to Community policy-making.
In October 1984, the EPU, in collaboration with, the 
University of Strasbourg and TEPSA, organised a conference to 
examine in detail the Draft Treaty Establishing the European 
Union. This Working Paper, presented at the conference and 
revised in light of the discussion, will appear in book form later 
in 1985 along with other studies of the Draft Treaty.
Further information about the work of the European Policy 
Unit can be obtained from the Director, at the European University 























































































































































































The European Parliament's Draft Treaty aims, as the 
preamble states, at "continuing and reviving" the European 
Communities as well as the European Monetary System and 
European Political Cooperation. Among these three forms of 
organization, only the European Communities are relevant, it 
seems, as far as the judicial system is concerned. Thus, the 
draft seeks to "continue and revive" the existing European 
Communities. The obvious approach to a discussion of the 
draft's meaning for the judicial system would consist, 
therefore, in outlining the major problems the actual 
functioning of the Communities has given rise to in this 
field.
However, that approach does not look very promising. It 
may be true that the draft intends to overcome a certain 
number of difficulties that tend to characterize the 
Communities' decision-making practices; the draft itself does 
not say so explicitly, but the explanatory statement starts 
by expressing Parliament's "dissatisfaction with the 
Community's institutional system" and its criticism of "the 
inadequate nature of the powers conferred on the Communities 




























































































dissatisfaction and these criticisms do not touch in any way 
the judicial system framed by the treaties establishing the 
European Communities. More particularly, they do not concern 
the Court of Justice and its activities. Signore Spinelli, 
who was perhaps more than any other member of the European 
Parliament actively involved in initiating and elaborating 
the draft, enumerated in a recent article six considerations 
and experiences that caused the Parliament to take the 
initiative, and none of these six motives had anything to do 
with the Court.2) Some other authors go one step further: 
they consider that only the Court actually operates as an 
integrative force in Europe and that it is the failure of the 
other institutions to play such a role which induced 
Parliament to act.3)
In these circumstances, it is not astonishing that the 
planned transition from European Communities to European 
Union does not, at first sight, imply major changes in the 
rules on the Court of Justice, or in the judicial system in 
general. On the contrary, many planned provisions have a 
familiar ring for those who have been working on the basis of 
the existing treaties. Such is, for example, the case of 
Article 4 of the draft on the protection of fundamental 
rights: in defining these rights as those "derived in 




























































































the Member States and from the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms", it 
adopts the formula developed by the Court's case law and 
later confirmed by a "common declaration" on human rights 
issued by the three other institutions.4)
There are novelties, nonetheless. Jurisdiction of the 
Court is extended (Article 43); a system of sanctions is 
devised (Article 44); and the prospect of an "homogeneous 
judicial area" is held out (Article 46). Each of these three 
innovations merits our attention, but before trying to 
analyse them, we should like to put them immediately in their 
proper perspective. The scope of judicial scrutiny depends 
not so much on matters of jurisdiction,■nor on the system of 
sanctions, but rather on standards applied by the courts in 
exercising judicial review. These standards have normally 
been developed over the years; this is also true in the case 
of the European Communities, where the .Court of Justice 
gradually constructed a body of case law with regard to the 
margins of judicial control on the basis of the legal 
principles that govern, in the treaties and in the 
administrative law of the Member States, the division of 
tasks between the judiciary, on the one hand, and the 
political and administrative bodies on the other. It would 




























































































jurisdiction could have a bearing on the standards applied 
for determining the scope of judicial review 5); in that 
regard, the new Article 43 might remain without any effect. 
It is worth adding one other observation: whatever the 
extension of the Union's powers, economic matters will still 
form the core of the Union's activities, as in the days of 
the Communities. Institutional changes alone will not solve 
the problems, well known in many legal systems, of combining 
the conduct of modern economic policies with the requirements 
of judicial review of administrative action.6) Things tend 
to develop very slowly, as judicial attitudes in this respect 
seem to depend on deep-rooted conceptions with regard to the 
role of courts in general.
Those who like change may, however, derive some comfort 
from the idea that the draft, apart from making minor changes 
in the judicial system, is based on a Union with objectives 
that are much more ambitious than those of the existing 
Communities. It is well known that the Court of Justice, in 
interpreting the law of the Communities, was often inclined 
to look at what legal provisions were meant to achieve, and 
that it thereby took account of the general aims of the 
European Communities. Its case law on social security was, 
for example, entirely based on this approach 7); the same 




























































































those concerning the definition of obstacles to intra- 
Community trade. The mere fact that the Draft Treaty fixes 
new and much wider objectives may thus, in the long run, 
provide fresh inspiration to the judges. The differences are 
not unimportant: whereas the EEC-treaty sets out to establish 
a common market and to promote a harmonious development of 
economic activities (Article 2), the Draft Treaty seeks to 
attain "a common harmonious development of society" and to 
promote peace and even the exercise of full political, 
economic and social rights by "all the peoples of the world" 
(Article 9).
More immediate consequences for the scope of judicial 
action may flow from the inclusion of the protection of 
fundamental rights. Comparative legal studies abundantly 
show how much the powers of judicial review are strengthened 
by the courts' willingness to consider themselves the 
ultimate guardians of human rights; American constitutional 
law, in particular, has undergone a complete- change, 
especially as far as the scope of review is concerned, since 
the Supreme Court started to reappraise the American Bill of 
Rights in the late forties.8) The American example is by no 
means isolated: the French Conseil constitutionnel only 
started to play an effective role in French political life 




























































































Constitution in such a way that its preamble embodies 
protection of human rights.9)
In the light of these experiences, an analysis of the 
judicial system can hardly be accomplished when the wider 
issues raised by the Draft Treaty are not discussed. We 
shall, therefore, first embark upon a rapid journey through 
the forests of jurisdiction and then steer our course to 
problems of substance, hoping thus finally to be able to give 
an overall assessment of the position of the judiciary under 
the Draft Treaty.
II Problems of Jurisdiction
a. General
Article 43 of the Draft Treaty adopts the Community 
rules governing judicial review, but it states that these 
rules shall be supplemented on the basis of seven 
"principles". These principles amount to seven roughly 
defined extensions of jurisdiction; detailed rules are to be 
given later in Union legislation. The draft has no 
provisions on the transition from the old to the new regime; 



























































































as the legislative bodies have not yet specified the new 
remedies.
The seven extensions are all related to lacunae in the 
actual rules on jurisdiction and to difficulties in their 
application that have been largely discussed at conferences 
and in legal literature.10) Their importance is, however, 
very unequal: some of them involve matters of principle,
others are of a sheerly technical nature. Anyhow, it would 
not appear that the seven clauses of Article 43 form 
Parliament's response to the Seven Deadly Sins of the 
Community; even pride and anger, although common elements of 
most political activities, are presumably far removed from 
the quiet world of judicial life.
b . Technical problems
In the technical category, I would, first range the 
extension of the right of action of individuals against acts 
of the Union that adversely affect them (Article 43-1). 
Under the present rules, access of individuals to the Court 
is excessively restricted. If private individuals, including 
businesses, corporations, and other "undertakings", are not 
themselves the addressees of a decision, their rights of 




























































































the EEC-treaty, they have to show that the provisions of a 
regulation or a decision are "of direct and individual 
concern" to them. Even a most liberal interpretation of 
these terms cannot bring the Community system into line with 
most national systems of administrative law, which simply 
require an "interest". Both the Court and the Commission 
recommended this extension in their opinions on the European 
Union given in 1975 at the request of the Council.il)
Does the change also mean that private persons can 
attack general rules as well as individual decisions? The 
answer must be affirmative; the existing provisions give 
already such a remedy to the Council, the Commission and the 
Member States. The proposed change brings the system of 
remedies closer to French administrative law, which always 
recognized appeals against regulations (though not against 
statutes); German and Dutch law have traditionally been more 
cautious. The result is then that, for example, any 
enterprise can ask annulment of a Commission regulation on 
group exemptions of a certain class of agreements from the 
prohibitions of Article 85 (e.g. exclusive licensing of 
patents), if it feels adversely affected. In other words: 
the door is henceforth wide open. The wider access to the 
Court may be conducive to a heavier case-load for that 




























































































from a legal point of view: direct actions against general 
rules issued by Union institutions can also be used to bring 
the European Parliament's exercise of its legislative 
function under judicial control. The Court of Justice would 
thus have the power to review legislation in a way 
constitutional courts usually have. The Court itself 
proposed as much in its opinion on the European Union.12)
Second item in the "technical" category: equal treatment 
for all the institutions before the Court (Article 43-2). 
This seems to imply two things. First, Parliament cannot, 
under the existing rules, bring an action for annulment under 
Article 173 EEC-treaty, although it can bring an action £or 
failure to act under Article 175; Article 173 limits the 
right of action expressly, as far as Community institutions 
are concerned, to the Council and the Commission. This is 
slightly illogical, and it could perhaps be helped by a 
somewhat imaginative interpretation, based on the unity of 
the system of remedies rather than on the precise wording of 
the relevant provisions; it is not completely impossible that 
the Court of Justice might be willing to take that route.13)
Secondly, equal treatment of institutions before the 
Court probably implies that the European Parliament and the 




























































































the Court, and to argue their case orally, in procedures 
concerning preliminary rulings. At present, the parties to 
the main action, the governments of the Member States and the 
Commission have these rights, and the Council only if the 
validity or the interpretation of one of its acts is at 
stake.14) In practice, the Council is only represented if 
the dispute involves the validity of one of its regulations; 
probably, therefore, Parliament will be the only institution 
to benefit from the principle of equal treatment. Or will 
perhaps the fifth institution that the Draft Treaty adds to 
the existing four, viz. the "European Council", develop the 
desire to make its views on legal matters known to the Court? 
It looks unlikely, but it cannot be excluded (in particular 
if the "European Council" will be endowed with a separate 
secretariat).
The third technical item is jurisdiction of the Court to 
annul an action within the context of an application for a 
preliminary ruling or of a plea of illegality. This 
extension of jurisdiction raises a highly technical point. 
It is probably based on the Commission's recommendation to 
restore the balance between the wide powers the Court has 
under Article 173 on actions for annulment and the very 
limited possibilities opened by Article 177 regarding 




























































































institutions15) The implications of the Commission's idea 
are not very clear. First, it may mean that provisions on 
the effects of annulment, like Articles 174 and 176, also 
apply when a regulation is declared invalid in a judgment 
under Article 177. The Court of Justice sometimes applied 
these provisions already by analogy in cases on preliminary 
rulings,16) but it has been severely criticized for doing 
so, and some of these judgments even roused the indignation 
of well-known French legal scholars.17) Second, the 
Commission's proposal may, however, involve a much wider 
problem: if direct actions for annulment under Article 173 
are well-founded, the Court declares the act in question to 
be "void", which has always been taken to mean that the act 
has never lawfully existed; on the contrary, a declaration of 
invalidity under Article 177 presently implies no more than 
that the act is not operative in the case at hand; the 
judgment does not work "erga omnes".18)
The Draft Treaty obviously takes up this latter idea by 
expressly granting a power of annulment in the framework of a 
preliminary ruling. In practical terms, this may not be a 
very impressive step; the Court has already held that 
national courts are not obliged to ask for preliminary 
rulings on the validity of an act whose invalidity has 




























































































under Article 177; the Court went out of its way to stress 
that national courts remained free to reintroduce the 
question, but that they should normally do so only if they 
felt doubts as to the extent of the invalidity already 
pronounced, or as to its consequences.19) However, the 
proposed change has considerable importance for the theory of 
invalidity; it has often been said that the existing rules, 
in opening possibilities for annulment only to certain 
parties and within certain time limits, and in accepting then 
a plea of illegality in pending litigation, with different 
consequences, aim at striking a balance between the 
requirements of legality of administrative action and legal 
certainty.20) The proposed reform could be seen as 
sacraficing the latter for the benefit of the former.
Will the reform increase the jurisdiction of national 
courts? Article 184, which embodies the plea of illegality, 
is usually considered as the expression of a general 
principle; the Court of Justice said so in one of its 
Simmenthal judgments.21) If that view is the correct one, it 
is possible to see the inclusion of questions of validity in 
Article 177 as the expression of the idea that any national 
court can, by way of a plea of illegality, be faced with a 
problem of validity, and that it was therefore necessary to 




























































































However, if that is true, the proposal to grant a power of 
annulment within the context of a plea of illegality implies 
that national courts will be able to pronounce such an' 
annulment, only supreme courts being bound to interrogate the 
Court of Justice before doing so. The monopoly of annulment, 
actually in the hands of the Court of Justice by virtue of 
Article 173, would be broken. Such a development would do 
great harm to the uniform application of Union law; it would 
also raise the delicate question whether annulment by a court 
of one Member State would have effect in a different Member 
State. For these reasons, it would seem wise not to 
introduce the proposed change without some accompanying 
measure; personally, I would be in favour of extrapolating 
slightly the line of the existing case law, by providing that 
national courts cannot pronounce the invalidity of acts of 
Union institutions without first having interrogated the 
Court of Justice.22) Such an amendment would amount to an 
increase of the number of cases in which.reference to the 
Court is compulsory. The step appears greater- than it 
actually is, as national courts will in practice always refer 
matters of validity of Community acts to the Court of Justice 
under Article 177. The German Finanzgerichte, very inventive 
in discovering validity problems, gradually developed a 
practice of never pronouncing on invalidity without having 




























































































be obliged to follow this road if their appreciation of the 
validity of common rules can entail the annulment of such 
rules.
c . Declarations of principle
«. i'
Under this heading, I bring first the clause on
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court to rule on any disputes 
between Member States in connection with the objectives of 
the Union (Article 43-7). These objectives being framed in 
wide terms, almost any litigation between Member States will 
belong in this category. The proposal thus broadens the 
provision of Article 182 EEC-treaty. Its result is an 
increase of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice at the 
expense of that of bodies like the International Court of 
Justice. This is interesting enough for those who like to 
theorize on the legal character of the proposed Union; but 
its practical bearing is slight, as litigation between Member
States is extremely rare.
»
The proposal has no relation to a recent declaration of 
the Heads of State and Government (European Council) to the 
effect that international agreements between Member States 
will, as far as appropriate, provide for jurisdiction of the 




























































































declaration - which concerns the relations between national 
courts and the Court of Justice, and not those between Member 
States - has a completely theoretical nature; it is the 
agreements between Member States themselves which are to 
provide for the Court's jurisdiction, and the negociating 
practice of the Member States' diplomats does not show an 
excessive zeal in that direction. The record of the Interim 
Committee on the Community Patent is a case in point: it 
first devised a "common patent appeals court" in order to be 
sure that matters of validity of Community patents would be 
looked into by real experts, and it then came gradually round 
to the idea that patent law could perhaps better do without 
any interference of the Court of Justice. It must be 
admitted, though, that the Court of Justice did not increase 
its popularity among patent experts by holding that, under 
certain conditions, the principle of free movement of goods 
precludes patent holders from relying on rights national 
legislation normally attaches to patents.24) ,
Second declaration of principle: the clause on 
jurisdiction of the Court to impose sanctions on a Member 
State failing to fulfill its obligations under the law of the 
Union (Article 43-6). As long as implementing legislation is
missing, it is hard to see what kind of sanctions the




























































































suspension of rights deriving from the application of the 
proposed treaty, or non-participation in certain Union 
institutions, for that is the kind of sanction only the 
European Council can impose under Article 44 and under 
Article 4, par. 4 of the draft, in case of "persistent 
violation" by a Member State of democratic principles or 
fundamental rights or of other important provisions of the 
treaty. If that is so, it is difficult to see what kind of 
sanction the Court should impose in case of a "normal" 
failure by a Member State to fulfill its obligations. Fines 
seem even less appropriate as a sanction for Member States 
than they were for great steel producers who chose to 
disregard the Commission's production quotas: they will not 
act as a deterrent. If the Member State's failure to fulfill 
its obligations consists of maintaining legislation not 
compatible with Union law, one might think of nullity of such 
legislation; the Court of Justice gave a little push in that 
direction by holding that citizens cannot be subjected to 
penal sanctions if the prohibitions upheld by these sanctions 
are incompatible with Community law according to a judgment 
rendered by the Court under Article 169.25) However, such an 
approach is not very helpful if the Member State's failure 




























































































The problem is not of the greatest importance. First, 
although at present the judgment that finds that a Member 
State failed to fulfill its obligations can only give a 
declaration to that effect, experience shows that the Member 
State concerned will comply, at least in the long run. 
Secondly, it is far from sure that the introduction of 
sanctions would help to accelerate the process : more often 
than not, failures to act stem not so much from conscious 
decisions to be slow, but from somewhat untidy tactical moves 
by governments or government agencies, aimed at staving off 
peasant rebellions or trade-union pressure or at ushering a 
certain amount of legislation through Parliament without 
major accidents.
d. Protection of fundamental rights
Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice for the protection 
of fundamental rights vis-à-vis the Union (Article 43-3) has 
already been extolled for a number of years.26) It is 
unproblematic, and at the same time it is the thin end of the 
wedge. It is unproblematic because everybody wants it, 
because it is in the line of the general evolution of the 
European Communities, because it would strengthen the "Europe 
of the citizen" and because it would ease some existing 




























































































And it is the thin end of the wedge because it may have a 
considerable impact on the scope of judicial review 
throughout the proposed Union. We shall deal with that 
particular topic when discussing matters of substance and 
stick, for the moment, to problems of jurisdiction in the 
strict sense of the word.
The Commission strongly recommended this extension of 
the Court's jurisdiction in its 1975 opinion on the European 
Union. It based its suggestions on the idea of the rule of 
law ("Rechtsstaat"), which it also found expressed in the 
Court's opinion, and it concluded that a Union treaty should 
provide for uniform binding rules protecting the rights of 
individuals. Therefore, it said, individuals should have 
comprehensive possibilities of access to the Court if they 
allege breaches of human rights and fundamental freedoms, so 
as to enable the Court to play a key role in safeguarding 
these rights and freedoms.27) These suggestions, which 
probably form the background of the proposed reform, may in 
their turn have drawn their inspiration from the German legal 
system, and especially from the particular form of action 
called "Verfassungsbeschwerde" (constitutional complaint). 
It is a general form of appeal to the federal constitutional 
court available to any person alleging that his fundamental 





























































































denied by any statute, judicial decision or administrative 
act.28)
If a right of action of such a general nature should be 
given to the citizens of the future European Union, its 
exercise will no doubt have to be qualified in order to keep 
the judicial system workable. In German law, for example, 
the rule is - subject to some exceptions - that ordinary 
remedies should be exhausted; without such a rule, the 
"Verfassungsbeschwerde" would, in a way, criss-cross through 
the normal remedies and appeals and so disrupt the ordinary 
working of the judicial system. The effect of the rule of 
exhaustion of remedies is that the constitutional complaipt
f
more or less functions as a kind of super-appeal, albeit with 
a limited scope, namely to enable the constitutional court to 
check whether the earlier judicial decisions in the case 
assessed the plaintiff's fundamental rights correctly. With 
some exaggeration, one might summarize the,situation as one 
in which a citizen first fights his way through local court, 
appeals court and supreme court and then asks the federal 
constitutional court to test whether these judges have duly 
respected his fundamental rights. There are two obvious 
consequences: the system makes litigation long and costly,





























































































Introduction of a remedy similar to the. German 
constitutional complaint would, then, provide the Court of 
Justice with powers to control the national courts. It might 
therefore provoke some hard feelings among the superior 
courts. It is difficult to see, however, how fundamental 
rights could be protected by the Court of Justice without 
implying a certain form of control of national courts. As it 
is, citizens will always be able to bring an action before a 
national court if they feel aggrieved in one way or another, 
be it by violation of their fundamental rights or otherwise. 
Community law, or Union law, will not diminish possibilities 
of access to courts existing at the national level, and a 
right of action before the Court of Justice will thus 
necessarily involve some element of scrutiny of.the national 
courts' performance.
These considerations raise a somewhat different problem. 
The proposed remedy will, according to the Draft Treaty, be 
available in all cases where "the protection of fundamental 
righs vis-à-vis the Union" is at stake. That expression 
seems to embrace violation of such rights by national bodies 
acting on the basis of Union law; the mechanism of the common 
agricultural policy is constructed in such a way that 
practically all individual decisions are taken by national 




























































































always fi^rst seize the national court as he would not like to 
lose his right to rely on other grievances than those 
concerned with fundamental rights. Is it open to the 
plaintiff, in such a case, to raise also the incompatibility 
of the national decision with the national constitution? 
Under the present treaties, this is a matter of national 
constitutional law, which has given rise to well-known 
differences of opinion. The German constitutional court will 
probably consider that protection of fundamental rights at 
the Union level dispenses national courts from controlling 
compatibility with the national constitution on that 
particular point 29); such would, at any rate, seem the 
situation if, and as far as, national bodies merely act as 
agents of the Union. The latter condition gives, however, 
rise to new problems: do, for example, tax inspectors act as 
agents of the Union when they levy value-added tax on certain 
transactions? Probably not; but in many instances, national 
legislation on VAT will raise exactly the same problems on 
human rights as the Community directives. Some national 
courts, like the Dutch Hoge Raad, always start from the 
assumption that national VAT legislation cannot be applied in 





























































































Double protection of fundamental rights, on the basis of 
the national constitution and on the basis of the Union 
treaty, therefore, cannot be excluded. To make matters 
worse, there may even be a treble protection, as the European 
Convention of Human Rights will continue to apply. The rule 
on the exhaustion of national remedies in that Convention 
30) implies, in my view, that an individual complaint to the 
European Commission of Human Rights would not be admissible 
before the Court of Justice has rendered its judgment under 
Article 43 of the proposed Union treaty. Chronologically, 
the Strasbourg institutions would therefore come last. This 
situation necessarily implies that the European Court of 
Human Rights will exercise a certain controlling function 
with regard to the decisions of the Court of Justice in this 
respect. Such would even be the case before the Union 
adheres to the European Convention in conformity with Article 
4(3) of the Draft Treaty. The right of action proposed in 
Article 43 for the protection of human rights will thus be 
conducive to a kind of "escalation" of remedies. These 
consequences make it urgent to take a fresh look at the 
question of how to reconcile the two great systems of legal 
integration in Europe, that of the Communities and that based
on the European Convention of Human Rights - a problem we
shall return to. The same consequences also show something




























































































protection of their fundamental rights at the Union level is 
the risk of having to wait quite a while for their claim to 
be ultimately settled.
e. Supervision of national courts
Article 43-5 intends to create a right of appeal to the 
Court of Justice against decisions of national courts of last 
instance where reference to the Court for a preliminary 
ruling is refused or where a preliminary ruling of the Court 
has been disregarded. The French text of the draft reads 
"pourvoi en cassation" for right of appeal.
The proposed introduction of this remedy rests on the 
assumption that national courts, and supreme courts in 
particular, presently fail to do what they should do, and 
that a direct appeal to the Court of Justice will help them 
mend their ways. Practitioners - and your reporter is among 
them - will have great difficulty in accepting these two 
basic premisses. As a general proposition, it is just not 
true that supreme courts fail to refer matters to the Court 
which they ought to have referred. Most statements to the 
contrary rely on considerations of a purely theoretical 
nature, or on isolated decisions which, without any further 



























































































general attitudes towards Community law, and in particular 
towards references to the Court of Justice.31) Such hostile 
behaviour on the part of national courts is very rare indeed. 
The duty to refer to the Court of Justice as embodied in 
Article 177, par. 3, EEC-treaty, requires national courts, 
and especially supreme courts, to meet two contradictory 
demands: on the one hand, they are to be aware that a 
persistent failure to refer will lead to lack of uniform 
application of Community law and so, ultimately, to 
disintegration of the Community as a legal entity; on the 
other hand, they should refrain from having recourse 
automatically to the Court of Justice in all cases having 
something to do with Community law (for example: in all cases 
on VAT), even in cases where every lawyer can guess the 
answer the Court will give. It has never been established 
or, indeed, been posited, that, as a rule, supreme courts 
have not been able to strike a reasonable balance between 
these two requirements.
There is more to it. The Court's case law assumes that 
Article 177 EEC-treaty is the expression of a general idea 
inherent in the Treaty's approach to the judiciary: the idea 
of collaboration between national courts and the Court of 
Justice. It is for that reason that the Court of Justice 




























































































faced with the question whether or not they are obliged to 
refer.32) In such a situation, granting a power of review of 
national decisions to the Court of Justice might amount to a 
change of approach, to the substitution of hierachy to 
collaboration.
This does not end the debate: would it be a good thing 
to have hierarchical relations between national courts and 
the Court of Justice? I wonder. First, it is not at all 
clear whether the system of preliminary rulings will 
effectively work better after such a change. Second, we may 
make tacitly a choice on the organisation of the judiciary in 
the European Union of the future, and we could very well have 
reasons to regret that choice later. In the long run, it is 
probably better for the European Union to have a "Union 
judiciary" alongside the national judicial hierarchy, just as 
the United States have a dual system of courts (federal 
courts and state courts).33) If that is the ultimate choice, 
it does not seem very obvious to begin by creating- appeals 
from state courts to the Union court, the Court of Justice. 
Many observers will think (and some do think already) that 
the Court of Justice is to be the ordinary appeal court for 
any question involving Union law.34) If the drafters of the 
Union treaty were really contemplating a central position of 




























































































European Union, they would have done better to create union 
courts of first instance for appeals exclusively implying 
Union matters and turning on points of fact more than on 
points of law, like courts of first instance in competition 
matters or an administrative tribunal for staff cases. 
Creation of such an administrative tribunal has already been
proposed by the Commission ; but the Council, in its own
mysterious way, discovered first a certain number of
difficulties and then found a new problem to every solution. 
However that may be, the time seems to have come to stop 
bickering about the lack of enthusiasm of one or two national 
courts in their dealings with Community law, and to start 
thinking seriously about the future outlook of the judicial 
system in a European Union. In that respect, the Draft 
Treaty is a lost opportunity.
Ill Matters of Substance
a. The objectives of the Union
We saw earlier that the objectives of the Union are 
couched in wide terms: the preamble alludes to the notions of 
democracy, human rights and rule of law; the objectives of 




























































































society to peace in the world; and the provisions on the 
policies of the Union enable the European Council, in Article 
68, to include defence policy and disarmament among matters 
to be submitted to cooperation and, eventually, to common 
action. There is some political cunning in the framing of 
the Draft Treaty's structure: it embraces many fields of 
action, but it does so in such a way as to permit considering 
the urgency of one form of action rather than another, and to 
elaborate gradually, subject by subject, the global policy of 
the Union. This evolving model of policy-making has definite 
advantages for the Union's decision-making practice; but that 
does not mean that it facilitates the work of judges who are 
to put a certain activity of one of the institutions in the 
general framework of the activities of the European Union. 
In other terms: the question is whether these wider 
objectives of the Union can still be made operational by the 
courts.
There is one easy answer to this: the Union takes over 
the Community patrimony, the famous "acquis communautaire" 
(Article 7), and encompasses thereby the aims of the EEC- 
treaty; hence, courts can continue to base their 
interpretations on these aims as they did before. This 
answer is, however, not completely satisfactory, for the real 




























































































Union objectives. These objectives are new only in part: 
they also partially restate some of the EEC aims - but not 
all. For example: Article 9 of the Draft Treaty restates the 
aim of progressive elimination of imbalances between regions, 
but it is silent about fair competition; it recapitulates the 
prospect of free movement of persons, without mentioning free 
movement of goods. There might, therefore, in the view of 
the drafters of the Union Treaty, be a kind of order of 
priority between different aims and objectives. One would 
hope not; for it is the very notions of fair competition and 
free movement of goods that have been crucial, in the Court's 
case law, for elaborating step by step the legal concept of a 
common market. Most of the "grands arrets" have been built 
on the idea that a common market implies abolition of 
discriminatory situations and of obstacles to intra-Community 
traffic.
There may be an element in the Draft Treaty to
counterbalance the possible loss of workable general
concepts : its institutional provisions are manifestly
intended to reactivate the legislative process. This is a 
very important point. Everyday experience shows that in many 
fields of Community action, harmonization of national 
legislation is long overdue. Whether courts can continue to 




























































































moment, will be brought about in the near future and that in 
the meantime case law can fill the gap is an ever more urgent 
question. Things get even worse when, as happens sometimes, 
politicians populating legislative bodies show their disdain 
of the Communities' objectives: can courts have resort to 
these same objectives when acting because nobody else 
does?35) If legislative machinery remains stuck for years 
and years, it is no longer up to the courts to put the 
situation right: they are not equipped for that type of work 
in the long run, and they cannot go beyond the inherent 
limits of the judicial office.36) The Draft Treaty aims at 
unlocking the wheels of the legislative machinery by giving a 
new shape to legislative power, which will be shared betwaen 
Council and Parliament. There is no certainty that mere 
changes in institutional provisions will accomplish this 
feat, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to venture 
predictions.37) But it would surely be bad for the future 
development of European law if judicial, decisions could 
neither rely on clear and workable concepts on long-term 
aims, nor on any real upsurge of rule-making activities.
The Union's takeover of the Community patrimony implies 
that fundamental market freedoms, as embodied in the EEC- 
treaty and as elaborated by the Commission's practice and by 




























































































courts, will continue to be in force. These market freedoms 
are individual freedoms derived from the concept of a common 
market.38) They have something in common with human rights; 
in German literature, their legal position has sometimes been 
characterized as "grundrechtahnlich", as not-so- 
dissimilar.39) It may be true that classical human rights, 
those, for example, embodied in the European Convention, find 
their basis in the freedom and dignity of the individual 
person; but some typical market freedoms, like the right to 
move freely or not to be discriminated against, are not far 
removed from this same sphere of thought. The question 
arises, then, how the relationship between these two 
categories of rights and freedoms must be seen and, in 
particular, which one is to prevail in case of contradictory 
implications.
The first thing one discovers when thinking about this 
problem is that most of the time the rights in these two 
categories reinforce each other rather than conflicting» 
Non-discrimination in the common market fortifies equal 
protection before the law, and the free development of the 
individual is helped by the freedom to move without being 
subjected to arbitrary interference by immigration police, 
custom officers or tax authorities. The freedom to choose 




























































































could hardly be effective without protection against abuse of 
a dominant position in the market.40) And the gradual
inclusion of aliens in the national regimes of rights and
freedoms can hardly be imagined without the Community's
efforts to obtain free movement of persons , and, in
particular, without the limits that have thus been put on the 
national authorities' previously unfettered discretion to 
expel aliens.41)
The remaining difficulty is what to do when there is a 
clash, and efforts to reconcile the effects of different 
freedoms fail. I would personally prefer not to take the 
general view that rights belonging to the classical human- 
rights catalogue should always and automatically override 
social and economic freedoms. Much depends on the persons 
who claim protection of their rights and freedoms, human 
rights being primarily concerned with protecting the weak 
against the mighty; on the situation in which protection is 
claimed, those involved against their will being better 
suited to having their claims upheld than those who willingly 
accepted that situation; on the intensity of the alleged 
breach, freedom of expression being more liable to be 
violated by forbidding demonstrations than by dissolving book 
cartels. When nothing helps, and when, finally, the chips 




























































































will be based on a clear political ideology, described in the 
opening words of the Draft Treaty as "commitment to the 
principles of pluralist democracy, respect for human rights 
and the rule of law", but that it is not based on any choice 
between competing economic philosophies.42) Wide-ranging 
objectives have thus their use, after all.
b . The judicial area
The "homogeneous judicial area" will be created, 
according to Article 46 of the draft, by cooperation between 
Member States, i.e. without the exercise of specific powers 
by Union institutions; Commission and Parliament "may", 
however, submit appropriate recommendations. The degree of 
homogeneity of the judicial area may thus become quite 
relative.
The Draft Treaty does not tell us what it means by 
"judicial area", but it gives two examples of measures apt to 
promote it. The first example is "measures designed to 
reinforce the feeling of individual citizens that they are 
citizens of the Union". As a good fishery policy will 
certainly reinforce (or even create) the fisherman's feeling 
that he is a citizen of the Union, a clause like this may 




























































































that the drafters have been toying with ideas like European 
passports, exchange of students and duty-free hand luggage. 
Anyway, the relation with the judicial system looks tenuous. 
That is certainly not so for the second example: the fight 
against "international forms of crime, including terrorism". 
In the past, suggestions have now and then been made to 
create such a crime-fighting area; for a certain time, 
President Giscard d'Estaing seemed to pursue the idea 
("espace judiciaire"). It is an interesting idea from a 
general point of view, as its implementation would extend the 
Union's business into the field of criminal law. 
Politically, there are some pitfalls in this path: experience 
has shown that some governments do not like to get involved 
in other governments' dealings with • terrorist movements. 
Even the mere coordination of extradition practices can, as 
the Basque problem has shown these last years, implicate 
nations in other nations' problems, or even in the 
accompanying violence.
Consequently, the two examples are not very helpful for 
finding out what the homogeneous judicial area can be taken 
to mean. The Union institutions could make a virtue out of 
necessity by inventing a legal program that can do justice to 
the ambitious wording of Article 46. Why not start a real 




























































































feelings ever since Pascal's jeering observations on the 
"trois degrés d'élévation du pole" that turn a whole body of 
case law upside down and on the "plaisante justice qu'une 
rivière borne".43) Modern conditions make many disparities 
even more difficult to understand and to accept. There is 
one snag: the institutions should first eliminate disparities 
that directly affect the establishment and functioning of the 
common market. And they can already do so now, on the basis 
of Article 100 EEC-treaty, a provision which has given rise 
to many studies but whose potential is not nearly exhausted: 
remarkably little has been actually done so far.
Meanwhile, the judicial area could as well wait for 
better times. Scant comfort is offered by one of the 
European Parliament's working papers on the Draft Treaty, 
seemingly content with the following considerations: "The 
creation of a judicial area will help to bring to fruition 
the concept of European citizenship, the main component of 
which is the common enjoyment of fundamental rights".44)
c . The impact of human rights protection
Only a few examples suffice to show that human-rights 
protection may conduce to quite important innovations of the 




























































































criminal procedure has been profoundly influenced by the U.S. 
Supreme Court's stand on human rights, and the prison system 
of many European countries had to be reformed because of the 
implications of the European Convention on Human Rights. To 
push the matter somewhat further; for a moment it looked as 
if capital punishment in the U.S. would be abolished by the 
Court as contrary to the American Bill of Rights, as were 
state laws forbidding abortion.45) I admit that these latter 
decisions came at a time which must by hindsight be described 
as one of the great epochs of judicial activism in America, a 
wave of activism that culminated about 180 years after the 
entry into force of the Bill of Rights, and one century after 
the introduction of the XIVth Amendment to the Constitution, 
which turned out to be such a great help to the Supreme 
Court. But I submit that comparative studies show how 
difficult it is to foresee changes in judicial attitudes in 
this respect; the French Conseil constitutionnel took 
everybody by surprise when it adopted its new approach in 
1971.46) In these matters, prophecies are even less-reliable 
than weather forecasts in Great Britain.
Nobody knows, therefore, whether the Court of Justice 
will be tempted to spread its wings in a comparable way. At 
all events, the Court's position under the Draft Treaty will 




























































































courts: under the existing arrangements, the Court and the 
national constitutional courts are, in a way, competing 
powers in the field of human rights; but the combined effect 
of Articles 4 and 43 of the Draft Treaty will be to confer 
certain controlling powers on the Court of Justice. Second, 
the delicate balance of power between the Court and the 
political institutions of the Union is tipped in favour of 
the former: not the legislative but the judicial power of 
the Union will have a final say on the meaning of fundamental 
freedoms, and thereby on the implications of these freedoms 
for all rule-giving and administrative activities. Third, 
the Court's stature in the eyes of the general public will 
increase, as it will be easier for the citizens of the Union 
to see the Court really as "their" court when they have more 
possibilities of entering into the passions of the litigants.
Other circumstances suggest that changes of judicial 
attitudes, if forthcoming, will be slow. It will, in the 
most optimistic forecast, take years and years before Union 
law will touch on matters of disarmament; it might very well 
even take years before Union policy will cover subjects like 
protection of the environment, coordination of urbanization 
schemes or prison reform. Many areas likely to give rise to 
human-rights problems will thus, for the moment, be excluded 




























































































will probably be characterized by efforts aimed at 
consolidating and expanding common economic policies and at 
extending the common market to fisheries and to transportion. 
The technicians of economic law will, for the moment, hold 
their ground.
Some further thinking gives, however, reason to foresee 
that unexpected developments may nevertheless occur. The 
Union scheme implies, according to the Draft Treaty, 
jurisdiction on human rights on the part of national courts, 
the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights; 
each of these categories of judges has its own contribution 
to make. The Strasbourg court may be more sensitive .to 
human-rights issues, just as its Luxembourg sister 
institution is more liable to respond to problems regarding 
discrimination, or division of powers among Union and Member 
States. Some mutual adjusting will be necessary. Even now, 
there are some areas in which Community law does not seem 
completely attuned to the evolutions that have taken place 
under the Human Rights Convention. The very liberal 
interpretation the Human Rights Court gives to "civil rights" 
covered by the fair trial clause of Article 6 of the 
Convention 47) may have important consequences for certain 
practices usually followed in the economic law of the 




























































































This brings us, finally, to the future existence of two 
areas of legal integration in Europe: the European Union and 
the Council of Europe, under whose auspices the European 
Convention on Human Rights functions. If the Union takes 
shape in the way indicated by the Draft Treaty, judicial 
relations between these two areas will be strengthened. The 
Union may, therefore, more and more become the real heart of 
the Council of Europe. Some political developments work in 
the same direction. In the near future, Spain and Portugal 
will accede to the Communities; Turkey will, if it does not 
begin to take return to democracy seriously, become only a 
nominal member of the Council of Europe. What remains then, 
are chiefly the Member States of the Community and the 
countries bound to it by free trade arrangements, like 
Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and Austria. In other words: 
the factual situation in the Council of Europe could be much 
the same as the one that is gradually evolving in the field 
of economic integration, where the Community takes the lead 
but works in close collaboration with the countries of the 
free trade area. This collaboration could be intensified, 
also at the judicial level. At the moment, the free trade 
agreements are interpreted by the Court of Justice as well as 
by the supreme courts of countries like Austria and 
Switzerland; there is a certian risk of diverging 




























































































a judicial collaboration between the Community and these 
countries, the future Union might inherit a judicial 
structure which, if gradually extended to other Union
matters, would in real terms be at the same time the judicial 
structure within the Council of Europe. After some time, the 
rift between the two organizations would vanish. Such a 
perspective might help to overcome certain fears among 
Community lawyers about a human-rights court partially
composed of judges from third countries that would impose its 
legal views on Union institutions.
d . The authority of Union law
"A genuine rule of law in the European context", said 
the Court of Justice in its opinion on the European Union, 
"implies binding rules which apply uniformly and which 
protect individual rights" . It also warned that the Union 
should not be given a looser legal structure than the 
existing Communities, as otherwise the value of Community law 
would be diminished.49) It looks as if the drafters of the 
Union Treaty took this warning to heart. Article 42 of the 
draft confirms the main principles actually underlying the 
significance of Community law: direct applicability, 
precedence over national law, joint responsibility of the 




























































































Union law, and possibilities of invoking that law before 
national courts. Wider access of individuals to the Court of 
Justice, and continuation of the system of preliminary 
rulings, will do the rest.
First problem: the fact that legal rules on the 
authority of Union law are uniform does not necessarily mean 
that this authority will be perceived and endured in the same 
way by all the citizens of the Union. The experience with 
the Communities has, so far, been very eloquent on this 
point. Different attitudes on the authority of Community law 
in, say, Italy and England result not only from different 
assessments of the European Community and its law, but also 
from different ideas about what authority is like. More 
uniformity depends on the evolution of ideas that are rooted 
in century-old traditions and in the way people behave 
towards their family, the Church, the burgomaster and the tax 
collector. Complete uniformity seems hardly desirable, but 
some progress in that direction can be made. As law evasion 
is nowadays rapidly spreading from South to North, and 
insolence with regard to public authorities from North to 
South, we should not despair too quickly.
Second problem: is there any effective stimulus for 




























































































their share in its implementation? There is, of course, the 
mechanism of sanctions provided for by Article 44 of the 
Draft Treaty. It may help, but it is unwieldy: it requires 
a request of Parliament or Commission, a finding of a 
persistent violation by the Court, a hearing of the Member 
State concerned, a draft decision of the European Council, 
approval by Parliament, and a definitive decision by the 
European Council. That will probably mean that it can only 
be used in cases of exceptional gravity. What remains is the 
possibility for private citizens or undertakings to appeal to 
the direct effect of the Union law over the head of national 
rules of implementation; experience shows that such a way is 
sometimes very effective.50) This attractive method is not 
always open: it cannot be used, for example, if the Union 
rules deny a right to somebody (e.g. to replant an old 
vineyard), or if they cannot be effective without 
collaboration of the national administration (e.g. premiums 
for stocking table wines for a certian period). Citizens 
always run the risk of drawing a blank when they'rely too 
much on the self-propelling qualities of Union law. 
Compliance with Union law by the Member States will therefore 
probably be secured in much the same way as the one that 
actually ensures the observance of Community law: it is a 
combination of political pressure by the Commission and by 




























































































action by the Commission or by citizens, and of feelings of 
solidarity; even the most unwilling administration sees after 
some time that the common interest ought to prevail. No 
statesman, whatever his (or her) brinkmanship, will easily 
take the risk of disrupting the European construction.
Third problem: will the system of sanctions contribute 
to the birth of a European Union that has all the 
characteristics of a federal state? Without engaging in 
battles on labels, one might nevertheless be realistic enough 
to see the difference between the proposed Union and the 
federal states that the world has witnessed these last two 
centuries. No expedition of the Union troops will call the 
defiant Member State to order. And it is perhaps better so: 
Robert Schuman's famous speech of May 9, 1950, that triggered 
off the integration process, sought exactly to displace 
movement of troops by more peaceful ways of coming to grips 
with each other.
I do not rule out, nevertheless, that the proposed 
system of sanctions has a certain bearing on the legal nature 
of the Union. 51) For me, it is especially Article 4 par. 4, 
on penalties against the Member State that persistently 
violates democratic principles, which gives the Draft Treaty 




























































































responsible for the Member States' carrying on their 
democratic traditions. Such a situation might have far- 
reaching effects on the international relations of the Union; 
but it may be too early to speculate.
IV The Place of the Judiciary
Under the Draft Treaty, the position of the judiciary 
will be reinforced. This increase of judicial power is in 
particular due to two general ideas which seem to belong to 
the mainstream of the views expressed in the draft: the 
generalization of judicial review and the judicial protection 
of human rights. It is pretty obvious that these ideas have 
been influenced by experience gained in countries with 
constitutional courts. It is also clear that the drafters of 
the Treaty focused their attention exclusively on the more 
general aspects of the jurisdiction of constitutional courts. 
It is curious to observe, in this connection, that the draft 
is silent on control of regularity of the elections of 
Members of the European Parliament - a more technical subject 
but one that could, even in the present situation, very well 
be committed to the care of the courts, and even perhaps to 
the care of the Court of Justice. In France, the Conseil 
constitutionnel has jurisdiction over "le contentieux 




























































































proposed Union and, perhaps, be a first little step on the 
way to uniform electoral procedures. 53)
The powers of the Court of Justice are strengthened by 
the Draft Treaty. This does not result from a reinforcement 
of the Court's position vis-à-vis the national courts, but 
from the place the Court has in the Union's judiciary: its
powers increase primarily at the expense of the powers of the 
other Union institutions. Is that an advantage? Personally, 
I am far from sure that general theories about the correct 
frontier between "the" judicial and "the" political area or 
between work of "the" courts and "the" legislative bodies can 
be of any great help.54) So much depends on the situation in 
which the dividing line is to be traced. It may be true, as 
Professor Cappelletti puts it in one of his recent books, 
that there is a general tendency towards an increase of 
judicial creativity nowadays 55); but such a general trend 
does not give us a recipe for every single occasion. On the 
whole, however, I would not regret a certain growth of 
judicial power in the actual situation of European
integration. There are certain things the proposed Union 
will probably have in common with the existing Communities; 
and these have been continuously troubled by their weak 
political structure. The Draft Treaty seeks to overcome




























































































whether the proposed institutional changes can achieve such a 
result. A Union that combines an ambitious program and far- 
reaching powers with a weak political structure may need a 
strong judiciary.
There is a second reason not to be too cautious in this 
respect: it is commonly acknowledged that, thus far, the 
Court of Justice has done its work well. The general layout 
of European law owes more to the patient needlework of the 
Court than to the defective legislative machinery or to the 
solemn declarations of these last years. It was the Court's 
case law that developed the legal principles which support 
Community law - principles many of which can now be found -in 
the Draft Treaty, like the priority of Community law, the 
direct effect of Community provisions and the protection of 
human rights. The very idea of legal principle as part of 
the law to be observed in the application of the treaties has 
been introduced and worked out by the Court. Its judgments 
have consistently, and from the very beginning in the early 
days of the Coal and Steel Treaty, tried to dig up the 
general principles of law that were gradually to form the 
backbone of the common law for Europe.56) As to further 




























































































Will, then, the Court's position in the famous
"équilibre institutionnel" be substantially changed? 
Parliament seems to think so, for the Draft Treaty modifies 
the method of appointing the members of the Court (judges and 
advocates general): under the Union Treaty, half of them
will be appointed by Parliament, the other half by the 
Council (Article 30 par. 2). The only explanation I have 
been able to find in the parliamentary documents is that such 
a solution is "fair and r e a l i s t i c 57) It is fair to add, 
however, that similar solutions exist in some countries for 
the appointment of members of the constitutional court.58) 
The proposal to follow these solutions in the framework of 
the Union may underestimate the difference between a national 
and a Community context. Experience shows that politicians 
usually assume - for reasons I personally fail to understand 
that the nationality of members of the Court is very 
important. The proposed method might thus lead to a 
situation where the Council would insist on the appointment 
of ten or twelve judges on its part, every government 
represented in the Council wanting, so to say, "his" judge; 
Parliament would then probably have to add as many, and the 
Court would become completely unmanageable. If parliamentary 
influence on the appointment of members of the Court is 
sought, I should prefer the American system of "advice and 



























































































the President, but the Senate has to give the green light.59) 
In fact, the American Senate developed a policy of exercising 
a certain control on the quality and the morality of the 
President's appointees in order to prevent, in particular, 
that a none-too-scrupulous administration could monopolize 
the Court for its own friends. There is no reason why the 
European Parliament could not play a comparable role.
One final word about the place of the judiciary in the 
Draft Treaty's scheme. The drafters rely heavily on the 
courts and on judicial activities for many things they have 
in mind in order to get European integration again on the 
move; that confidence is not misplaced. They also propose 
specific ways in which the judiciary would get more involved 
in aspects of the integration process, as the proposed 
extensions of the Court's jurisdiction show; some of these 
proposals are important and interesting, although some others 
may disappoint. But all this should not make us forget that 
the real problem does not lie here: it is just feasible to 
make treaty provisions on jurisdiction, and that is perhaps 
easier than to frame a common policy on nuclear energy, or on 
road transport, or on river pollution. It is these policies, 
however, that Europe is waiting for, alongside of a great 




























































































European law cannot be made by lawyers alone. That may 
be a sobering thought for those who like to reflect on the 
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